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Abstract 
 
 
Foreign technological advance unambiguously reduces home welfare in a popular variant 
of the Melitz (2003) model that assumes the presence of a costlessly traded homogeneous  
good (Demidova, 2008). The present paper shows that this result is sensitive to the 
presence of such a good and is reversed in its absence. Indeed, in a generalized version of 
the Melitz model that adds a  nontraded good and nests the original version as a special 
case, we show that foreign technological advance always improves home welfare. We 
derive relations that require information on only a few parameters to calibrate the model 
to data. These relations are used to calibrate an international trade model for the United 
States for quantitative analysis of the welfare effects. US is found to gain much less from 
foreign technological improvements than its trading partners from US improvements. 
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1. Introduction  
What role does international trade play in transmitting the welfare effects of 
technological improvements in a country to its trading partner? In traditional models of 
international trade (based on Ricardian or Heckscher-Ohlin frameworks), the terms of 
trade adjustment allows the trading partner to share the benefits of the country’s 
technological advance. Recent models with monopolistic competition and heterogeneous 
firms have additional adjustment mechanisms that can lead to different welfare 
implications. Indeed, using a popular variant of the Melitz (2003) model that assumes the 
presence of a freely traded homogeneous (outside) good, Demidova (2008) has 
demonstrated that foreign technological advance unambiguously reduces home welfare. 
However, it is not clear if this result is a robust implication of the Melitz model and will 
hold for other versions of the model without the outside good.  
 The outside-good assumption has been used widely to simplify the solution of the 
Melitz model by tying the home wage to foreign wage.
1
 The welfare implications of the 
model, however, can be very sensitive to the presence of the outside good. For example, 
Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2013) show that unilateral trade liberalization always 
improves the welfare of the liberalizing country in the absence of an outside good.
2
 This 
result contrasts sharply with the welfare implications of unilateral trade liberalization in 
models with an outside good such as Demidova (2008) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) 
that the liberalizing country can suffer a welfare loss. The role of the outside good in 
                                                 
1
 This assumption goes back to Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), and has been used by a number of 
recent studies, for example, Baldwin and Forslid (2010), Baldwin and Okubo (2009) and Chor (2009). 
2
 Also see Felbermayr and Jung (2012), who generalize the Demidova- Rodriguez-Clare analysis to a two 
country version with fully endogenous wage rates, and show that the welfare effect of a tariff  reduction 
differs from that of a decrease in (iceberg) import cost.  
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determining the welfare effect of an asymmetric change in technology, however, has not 
been examined so far and is explored in the present paper.   
 We use a variant of the Melitz model that excludes the outside good but adds a 
homogeneous nontraded good. This version is appealing as it allows for nontraded goods 
that represent a large and a growing sector in most economies and are assigned an 
important role in many macroeconomic and international trade models.
3
 The presence of 
the nontraded good also introduces an additional adjustment mechanism operating via the 
relative price of nontraded to traded goods. This mechanism is highlighted in the Balassa-
Samuelson theory of how productivity improvement in the traded good sector affects the 
real exchange rate.
4
 The share of the nontraded good is an important parameter in our 
model, but we can let it equal zero and thus nest the basic Melitz version as a special case 
of our model and explore how results differ with and without the nontraded good. 
 The solution of the model with the nontraded good is more complex, but we 
derive three relations that determine the home and foreign real wage (representing the 
welfare of the representative households in the home and foreign countries), and the real 
exchange rate.
5
 We consider technological advance arising from improvements in labor 
efficiency as well as in the productivity distribution (in the form of either higher 
dispersion or support of Pareto distribution) of the differentiated good. For each of these 
improvements, we show that a small foreign technological improvement (around an 
                                                 
3
 Our setup, moreover, is analytically equivalent to a widely used model, in which the traded differentiated 
product is an intermediate input used in a nontraded and homogeneous final good. 
4
 Also see Ghironi and Melitz (2005) who examine the effect of an improvement in aggregate productivity 
on the real exchchange rate in a DSGE version of the Melitz model. 
 
5
 The home and foreign real wage is defined, respectively, in units of home and foreign aggregate 
consumption (including both the traded and nontraded goods) and the real exchange rate is the price of 
foreign in terms of home consumption.  
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initial symmetric state) would always improve home welfare. This result holds regardless 
of whether the nontraded good is present or not, although its presence makes an 
important difference to the transmission process and the magnitude of the welfare effect. 
Thus the effect of foreign technological change on home welfare in the model without the 
outside good is opposite to that with the outside good.  
 The paper also examines the welfare implications of an asymmetric change in the 
size of labor force. We show that a larger foreign size improves home welfare and is 
similar to foreign technical progress in this respect. We also identify conditions under 
which foreign technological improvements decrease the real exchange rate (depreciate 
the real value of the foreign currency) contrary to the predictions of the conventional 
Balassa-Samuelson theory. The conditions for the reversal of the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect have been examined for the monopolistic competition model with homogeneous 
firms (e.g., see Choudhri and Schembri, 2010), but have not been explored for the Melitz 
model with heterogeneous firms.  
 Our three-equation representation of the model facilitates the calibration of the 
model to a real economy. We develop a procedure that requires knowledge of only a 
subset of model parameters to calibrate the model to data. We use this procedure to 
develop a quantitative international trade model for the United States. As income per 
capita and the shares of traded goods differ significantly between the US and its trading 
partners, our numerical analysis allows for initial asymmetries. We are also able to 
examine the effect of large changes. The numerical analysis supports the analytical 
results based on small changes around initial symmetry. We find, however, that the 
increase in the welfare of US trading partners resulting from US technological 
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improvements is much stronger than the increase in US welfare caused by non-US 
technological advance. The US is generally viewed as the technological leader, and one 
concern is that catch up by less advanced countries may hurt the US.
6
 The results of our 
calibrated model suggest that narrowing of the technological gap would confer positive, 
albeit small, benefits to US.  
The model is briefly described in Section 2. Section 3 discusses key analytical 
results. Numerical analysis based on the calibration of the model to US economy is 
presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
2. Model 
 This section describes a setup that introduces a nontraded good in a model with 
heterogeneous firms and two asymmetric countries. The consumption basket in each 
country includes a nontraded homogeneous good and a bundle of domestic and foreign 
varieties of a traded differentiated good. There is only one primary factor, labor, which is 
used in the production of both goods. In describing the model below, we focus on the 
relations for the home economy. Analogous relations hold for the foreign economy, 
where an asterisk is used to denote foreign variables and parameters. 
 The utility level depends on aggregate consumption, which is determined by the 
following Cobb-Douglas function: 
 
1 1/ [ (1 ) ]C N Z       , (1) 
where N  is the amount of the nontraded good and Z represents an index of the traded-
good bundle. The nontraded good is produced under perfect competition, and one unit of 
                                                 
6
 For example, Krugman’s (1986) model of technological gap based on the Ricardian framework implies 
that technical progress in less advanced countries may be harmful for more advanced countries, although 
less advanced countries always benefit from technological improvements in more advanced countries. 
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labor is needed to produce one unit of this good. Let NL  denote the amount of labor 
employed in the production of this good. Also, let w  and p  denote the real wage rate 
and the real price of the traded good bundle in units of aggregate consumption, C . Then, 
noting that NL N  and the real wage equals the real price of the nontraded good, we 
obtain the following demand functions from (1):       
 (1 ) /NL C w  , (2) 
 /Z C p . (3) 
Moreover, since the real price of the numeraire C  equals unity, (1) implies that  
 
11 w p  . (4) 
The above setup is analytically equivalent to a widely–used framework where inputs of 
labor and an intermediate-good bundle of traded varieties are used to produce a nontraded 
final good, C .7  
 The model for the differentiated good is based on Melitz (2003), but allows labor 
efficiency and productivity distribution for firms to differ between the home and foreign 
countries. The production of one unit of a home variety requires 1/   units of home 
labor. Parameter   is a measure of home labor’s efficiency while   represents a firm-
specific productivity index, which is drawn from a distribution, ( )g  , after incurring a 
sunk entry cost, /  , in units of home labor. Each Firms also faces (in units of domestic 
labor) a fixed cost per period, /  , to produce a variety, and an additional fixed cost per 
period, /E  , to export the variety. The corresponding costs for foreign firms are 
                                                 
7
 For example if instead of (1), we assume that C  is produced according to the production function, 
1 1/ [ (1 ) ]NC L Z
       , we would still get relations (2)-(4). 
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* * * */ , /     and * */E   in units of foreign labor. The production requirements of a unit 
of a foreign variety are * *1/    units of foreign labor with  *  drawn from a distribution, 
* *( )g  . Technological differences between the home and foreign countries can arise 
because of differences in labor efficiency ( *  ) or productivity distribution
*[ (.) (.)]g g . Exports of a variety by a home or foreign firm is also assumed to  be 
subject to a melting iceberg trading cost such that 1   units of the variety have to be 
shipped for one unit to arrive. 
 The traded-good bundle includes a continuum of home and foreign varieties and 
is defined as 
 ( 1)/ ( 1)/ 1H FEZ Z Z

          , (5) 
where  
( 1)/ 1
H
H HZ Z d

  

 
 

 
  
,  *
( 1)/ 1* *
FE
FE FEZ Z d

  

 
 

 
  
,  are the 
aggregates of varieties supplied by home firms and  foreign exporters; ( )HZ   and 
*( )FEZ  are the amounts produced by firms indexed  by   and 
* , respectively; H  is 
the set of home firms while FE  is the subsets of foreign firms representing exporters; 
and   is the elasticity of substitution between varieties (assumed, for simplicity, to be 
the same between any pair of varieties regardless of where they are produced). 
 The demand for each type of variety is given by 
 
*
*( ) ( )( ) , ( ) ,
, ,
H FE
H H FE FE
H FE
H FE
H FE
p p
Z Z Z Z
p p
p p
Z Z Z Z
p p
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
    
   
   
    
   
 (6) 
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where *( ),  and ( )H FEp p   are real prices in units of C . The real price index of the 
aggregate bundle (also in units of C ) equals: 
  
1
1 1 1
H FEp p p
      . (7) 
where  
1
1 1
H
H Hp p d
 

 
 

 
  
, and  *
1
1 1* *
FE
FE FEp p d
 

 
 

 
  
. 
The optimal real prices for home and foreign varieties in the home market are set as  
 
*
* *
( ) , ( )
1 1
H FE
w qw
p p
  
 
    
     
       
      
, (8) 
  
where *w  is the real wage in units of *C , and q  denotes the real exchange rate as the 
relative price of *C  in terms of C  (the real value of the foreign currency). 
 The minimum levels of   required for a home firm to produce a variety for the 
home and foreign markets are readily derived from (6), (8) and their foreign counterparts. 
Use these relations to express real profits of home firms from domestic sales ( H ) and 
exports ( HE ) as 
 1 1 * 1 1( ) ( ) ( / ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( / ) ,H HE EDw w D q w w
                      (9) 
where 
1( / )[ /( 1)]D p Z       and * * * 1( / )[ /( 1)]D p Z       are indexes of 
demand levels at home and abroad. Real profits from each operation increase in  . Let 
H  and  HE  denote the cutoff productivity levels for local producers (supplying only 
domestic market) and exporters (supplying both domestic and foreign markets), i.e., the 
minimum values of   that imply 0 and 0H HE   . From (9), these levels are 
determined as 
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1/( 1)1/( 1)
1
*
, EH HE
ww
D D q
  
  
 
 
 

  
    
   
. (10) 
 
The cutoff values for foreign firms, 
F , and FE  are defined analogously. We assume 
that 1 *
E D D q
      (and * 1 * *E D q D
     )  in equilibrium, so that H HE   
( )F FE   and the sorting pattern (suggested by empirical evidence) that non-exporting 
firms are less productive than exporting firms is satisfied. 
 Following Melitz (2003), define the average productivity for all firms and 
exporters (by aggregating over the relevant productivity range) as 
1/( 1)
1 ( )
1 ( )H
H
H
g
d
G



 
 



 
  
 
  and 
1/( 1)
1 ( )
1 ( )HE
HE
HE
g
d
G



 
 



 
  
 
 ,   
where ( )G  is the cumulative distribution function. We assume that ( )g   follows a 
Pareto distribution as in Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), with shape parameter k 
( 1)   on support  ,b    for some b > 0. In this case,   1 ( / )kG b   , 
  1/k kg kb   , and thus 
 
   
1/( 1) 1/( 1)
,
1 1
H H HE HE
k k
k k
 
   
 
 
   
    
      
. (11) 
 The foreign distribution, 
* *( )g  , also assumed to be  Pareto, could have different shape 
parameter and support (i.e., * * * * * * * 1( ) /k kg k b   ).  
 Denote the probability that a home firm will survive after drawing its productivity 
level by [ 1 ( )]H HG   , and the conditional probabilities that a survivor will export by 
[ 1 ( )] / [1 ( )]HE HE HG G     . These probabilities are determined according to the 
Pareto distribution as 
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 ( / ) , ( / )k kH H HE H HEb      . (12) 
The price indexes in (7) can be related to average productivity indexes as 
 
*
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )
* *
,
( 1) ( 1)
H H FE FE
H FE
w qw
p n p n 
 
    
        
    
, (13) 
where Hn  is the mass of firms in the set H , and FEn  represents the mass of firms in the 
set FE . Also, using (9) and (11), we can relate average profits from different operations 
of surviving home firms to average productivity indexes as 
 
1 1 * 1 1( ) ( / ) , ( ) ( ) ( / )H H HE HE EDw w D q w w
                   . (14) 
 Assume that after entry, a firm in each period faces an exogenous probability,  , 
that it will exit (die). In steady-state equilibrium, the mass of firms is constant, so that the 
number of new firms entering in each period equals the number exiting in the period. 
Free entry implies that the present discounted value of ex-ante average profits equals the 
entry cost. Assuming, for simplicity that the discount rate equals zero,
8
 this condition can 
be expressed as 
 / /Hw     , (15) 
where H HE HE      represents average ex-post profits for all firms. Since HE   
represents the relative frequency of home firms undertaking exports in steady state, we 
also have 
 HE HE Hn n . (16) 
 
 Let ZL  denote total labor demand by home producers of the differentiated good. 
The condition for labor-market equilibrium in steady state is 
                                                 
8
 This is a standard simplification that has been used by Melitz (2003) among others. See Baldwin (2005) 
for further discussion of this simplifying assumption. 
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 ( / )( / )N Z H HL L L n      , (17) 
where L  is home labor supply, and /H Hn   represents labor requirements of 
/H Hn   firms in the entry process (a proportion H  of this  number of firms successfully 
enters the industry and replaces Hn  exiting firms in steady-state equilibrium). 
Moreover, trade balance in steady state implies that 
 *
HE HE FE FEp Z p Z . (18) 
Finally, since the free entry condition implies that total entry costs ( /H Hn w  ) equal 
total profits [ Hn  ], it follows that expenditure equals labor income: 
9
 
 C wL . (19) 
3. Analytical Results 
 The home welfare level (for a representative agent) is measured by /C L , which 
equals w  according to (19). Thus the model needs to be solved for w  to determine the 
welfare level. To obtain the solution for w , we proceed as follows. First, we use the free-
entry condition and the relation for profits to show that w  is a function of the ratio of 
cutoff levels of non-exporters to exporters ( /H HE  ). Next, we show that this ratio 
depends on */w w  and q . We then derive two relations, which are used to determine 
these variables. 
3.1 Key Relations 
                                                 
9
 To derive (19), note first that NC wL pZ   from (2) and (3). Next, use (6), (7), (13), (14) and their 
foreign counterparts, and (18) to obtain: ( )N Z H H HE HEC w L L n n     . The right hand side of this 
equation equals wL  since ( ) /N Z H HwL w L L n w     from (17) and /H H H H HE HEn w n n      
from (15). 
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   We start by relating D  (the demand level index) to w . Use the definition of D  
in (9) and use (3), (4) and (19) to substitute for p and Z in it to obtain 
 
1
1 ( 1)(1 )/
1
D Lw

   
 

     
 
. (20) 
Note that the elasticity of D  with respect to w  equals 1 ( 1)(1 ) /     , and its sign 
depends on the relative strength of the positive income effect via C  and the negative 
substitution effect via p . The substitution effect operates via the adjustment in the 
relative price of nontraded to traded goods and is absent in the model without the 
nontraded good. Making use of (10), (12) and (21), we can express the probability that a 
new entrant will survive as 
  
//( 1) 1
k
kk
H L w
   
   , (21) 
where    
/( 1)
( 1) / / ( )
k k
b

   

   . The negative relation between H  and w  arises 
because an increase in w  leads (though its direct plus indirect effect via D ) to an 
increase in the cutoff level, 
H , which lowers H . 
 Letting / w   denote the ratio of average ex-post profits to the wage rate (i.e., 
average profits in units of labor), substituting the expression for H  in (21) into the free-
entry condition (15), and solving for w , we obtain 
  
/
/( 1) 1 /( 1) /
k
k kw L
       . (22) 
The positive association between w  and   in (22) arises because an increase in   must 
be offset by a decrease in H  to satisfy the free entry condition. The decrease in H , in 
turn, requires (for reasons discussed above)  an increase in w . 
13 
 
 We next express the profit-wage ratio as an increasing function of the ratio of 
cutoff levels. Use (10), (11), (12), and (14) to obtain the following relation (see Appendix 
A for the derivation):  
 1
k
E H
HE
 
 
  
      
   
, (23) 
where 1
( 1)
k
k

 
 
   
  
. According to (10), the cutoff ratio equals 
1/( 1)
*
1H
HE E
q D
D

 

 

    
 
. We can use (20) and its foreign counterpart to express the ratio 
as
10
 
 
1/( 1)
*
1 /( 1)
*
H
HE E
L w
q
L w
 
  
 

        
  
, (24) 
where 
1 1
1


 

 

, and its sign is positive (negative) if the substitution effect of w  
on D  is stronger (weaker) than the income effect. As (24) indicates, the traded good 
share plays an important role in determining the effect of the relative wage on the cutoff 
ratio. In the special case of 1   (no nontraded good),   is negative. As   decreases, 
  increases and turns positive at a sufficiently low value. Finally, using (24) to substitute 
for /H HE   in (23) and then using the resulting expression to eliminate   in (22), we 
derive the following relation, in which w  is a function of */w w  and q : 
   
/
/( 1) 1 * /( 1) * /( 1)/
k
k
k k kw L L w w q

         
  
, (25) 
                                                 
10
 For simplicity, we assume that 
*  . This assumption is relaxed in the numerical analysis below.  
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where 
1 /( 1)k 

 
   and  
1
1/
k
k
E
  

  .  
 Although (25) is derived to facilitate the solution of this paper’s model, the 
derivation utilizes only the relations for the differentiated good. Thus (25) also holds for 
the original Melitz (2003) version with one differentiated good as well as the Helpman, 
Melitz and Yeaple (2004) variant that adds an outside good. If the home and foreign 
countries are symmetric, 1q   and */ 1w w  , and (25) is sufficient to determine home 
welfare.
11
 If countries are not homogeneous, further analysis is needed to determine 
*/w w  and q . In the setup with an outside good, 
*w qw .12 Under this condition, (25) 
implies that w  is, a decreasing function of *w  and thus an increase in foreign wage 
brought about by a foreign technological improvement would lower home welfare as in 
Demidova (2008).
13
   
 We derive two further relations to solve the model with the nontraded good.  
Using foreign counterparts of (20)-(24), we first obtain the following relation for the 
foreign wage: 
   
*/ *
*
* * * */( 1) * 1 */( 1) * * /( 1)/
k
k
k k kw L L w w q

          
  
, (26) 
                                                 
11
 Choudhri and Marasco (2013) use this approach to determine the gains from trade and FDI for symmetric 
countries in the presence of a nontraded good. 
12
 This equality holds because the price of the homogeneous traded good is the same in the two countries 
and equals the wage rate in each country (by normalization). Without symmetry, however, 1q   
*and w w . 
13
 Note that with */q w w , the expression 
*
1
k k
w
q
w
 
 
 
 
 
 in (25) equals 
/
*
k
w
w

 
  
 
,  and (25) simplifies to 
  
/
/
/( 1) 1 * /( 1) */
k
k
k kw L L w w

      
  
. 
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where 
** * *1 /( 1)
*
* *
k  
 
  
   and  
*
1
* * * * 1/
k
k
E
  

  . The second relation is based on 
the equations for the home and foreign prices of the traded good and the conditions for 
balanced trade, and takes the following form: 
 
/( 1)
*
/( 1)
*
* *
1 *** *1 11
*1 1
* *
1
k k
k
k k
k kk k
L w
q
L ww
w
L w L w
q q
L w L w
 
 
   
 



 
 
   
    
  
 
                       
. (27) 
 
This relation is derived in the Appendix A.  
3.2 Model Solution 
 The system consisting of (25), (26) and (27) can be solved for 
*,  and w w q . To 
simplify the solution of the model, we take a first-order log-linear approximation of these 
relations around an initial state where the two countries are symmetric. Let a bar denote 
the initial value of a variable in the symmetric state and a hat the log deviation around 
this value (i.e., ˆ ( ) /q q q q  ), and express (25), (26) and (27) as 
 *
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )
1 1
w w w q



 
     
, (28) 
 * *
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )
1 1
w w w q



  
     
, (29) 
  * *
2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1
1 1 1
k
w w k w w q



  
         
. (30) 
 The log-linear model can be solved recursively. First, it can be reduced to a 
system of two equations in two variables, the change in relative welfare *ˆ ˆw w , and the 
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change in real exchange rate qˆ . Subtracting (29) from (28), and noting that 
1
1



 

, we obtain 
 *
11 12
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) 0c w w c q   , (31) 
where 
11
2
1 1
1 1
c


  
       
 and 
12
2
1 1
c


 
   
  
. Express (30) as 
 *
21 22
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) 0c w w c q   , (32) 
where 21
2
1
1
c k

 

 and 
22
2
1
1 1
k
c


  
  
  
. We have 12 0c  . Also, we have 
11 0c   and 22 0c   since 
1
1
1
k
k E




 
   
 
 and 1 1
1


 

. For 1  , 
21
2
1 0
1 1
k
c


  
   
as 1  and 1k   . For 1  , however, the sign of 21c  is 
given by the following result: 
Result 1. There exists a value of  , 
1
1
1,
1


 
 
 
 such that 
 
1
21
1
0
0
if
c
if
 
 
 

 
. 
The result is proved in the Appendix A. Note that   is positive or negative as   is 
greater or smaller than 
1
1 
. For 
1
1




, 21c  is clearly positive. Result 1 shows that 
21c  is also positive for a range of values of   below 
1
1 
.  
 The solution of the model is illustrated in Figure 1 for the case of 
1
1




, 
which implies 0   and 1  . In this figure, FE represents an upward-sloping curve 
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between *ˆ ˆw w  and qˆ  implied by (31) based on the free entry condition, with its slope 
equal to 12 11/c c . In the illustrated case, PT  represents a downward-sloping curve 
between the two variables derived from (32) based on the price relations for traded goods 
and the trade balance condition, with its slope equal to 22 21/c c . The initial equilibrium 
is at the symmetric state with *ˆ ˆ 0w w   and ˆ 0q  . 
For later use, the figure also includes a U  curve that shows the values of the two 
variables that would maintain the initial level of home welfare. This relation is obtained 
by setting the left hand side of (28) equal to zero and is given by 
 *ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) 0
1
w w q



  

. (33) 
 The sign of   determines the slope of the U  curve. In the illustrated case with 0  , 
the U  curve slopes downwards and is steeper than the PT curve.
14
 In this case, it is easily 
verified that at any point above the U  curve, home welfare is higher than the initial level. 
The terms of trade (the relative price of the export to import bundle) can also be 
related to */w w  and q . Noting that */ /HE FE FE HEp p Z Z  from (18), we can use (6), (20) 
and their foreign counterparts to express the terms of trade as 
   
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )
* * * * 1/( 1) * /( 1)/ / / ( / ) ( / )HE FEp p Zp Z p q D D q L L w w q
              . 
Holding the terms of trade constant, log-linearization of this relation around a symmetric 
initial state also yields (33). Thus along the U  curve, both the home welfare and the 
terms of trade are unchanged. Any point above the U  curve represents an improvement 
in the terms of trade over the initial level. 
                                                 
14
 The slope of the U curve equals / ( 1)    , and its absolute value is greater than the absolute value 
of the slope of the PT curve. 
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 3.3  Foreign Changes 
 In the present model, improvements in foreign technology can result from 
increase in foreign labor efficiency (larger * ) or a better (Pareto) productivity 
distribution in the form of an increase in the minimum productivity level (higher *b ) or 
productivity dispersion (lower *k ).
15
 The effects of each of these foreign technological 
improvements on the real exchange rate and both relative and absolute home welfare are 
summarized in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1. Given a symmetric initial steady state; (i) a small increase in either *  or 
*b causes an increase in w , a decrease in */w w , and an increase or a decrease in q as 
 is greater or smaller than 
1 ; and, (ii) a small decrease in 
*k  causes an increase in  
w ,  and an ambiguous effect on */w w  and q  . 
Proposition 1 is proved in Appendix A. We can explain the effects in this 
proposition with the help of Figure 1, which assumes 
1
1




. An increase in either *  
or *b would shift FE curve rightwards, but would not affect the PT curve. In the new 
equilibrium, shown in Figure 1 by the point where FE  and PT curves intersect, */w w  is 
lower while q  is higher. Also, w  increases since the new equilibrium point is above the 
U  curve (which does not shift), As the terms of trade also increase at this point, higher 
                                                 
15
 Notice that both an increase in the support 
*b  and a decrease in the shape parameter *k  ensure that the 
foreign distribution first order stochastically dominates (FSD) the home distribution of productivities, while 
only with a lower 
*k  will the foreign distribution satisfy the stronger condition of hazard rate stochastic 
dominance (HRSD) over the domestic distribution. This is because the hazard rate function for a Pareto 
distribution with support b and shape parameter k  is 
 
1( )
1 ( )
k k
k
g kb k
G b
 
 

 

 which is not a function 
of the support b. 
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home welfare can be attributed to an improvement in the terms of trade. A decrease in *k  
would lead to rightward shifts in both FE and PT curves, but would not shift the U  
curve. Thus  and q w  both increase, but the effect on */w w  depends on the relative 
magnitude of the shifts of the two curves. Figure 1 illustrates an equilibrium for this case 
(shown by the intersection of FE  and PT ) where the shift in the FE curve is larger and 
*/w w  decreases. 
Note that if 
1
1




, the U  would slope upwards, but the results would not be 
affected.
16
 If 1  , moreover, the PT curve also slopes upwards and can be shown to be 
steeper than both U  and FE curves. In this case, an increase in *  (or *b ), which shifts 
only the FE curve right, would lead to a decrease in q  (as well as */w w ). There would 
still be an increase in w . The qualitative effects are the same if 1  .17 Thus, in the 
model without the nontraded good, higher foreign productivity improves home welfare, 
but contrary to the Balassa-Samuelson model, depreciates the real value of the foreign 
currency.
18
 A decrease in *k  would shift both FE and PT curves, and the effect on q  is 
uncertain even in the case of 1   (or 1  ).  
Larger foreign size can also have important welfare implications. Key effects of 
an increase in foreign labor force are described by Proposition 2. 
                                                 
16
 In this case, points below the U  curve represent an improvement in welfare. 
17
Since, 0   and 21 0c   for 1  , this case  also implies that both U  and PT curves slope upwards and 
PT is steeper than U . 
18
 Note, however, that the real exchange rate in our model is defined in terms of welfare-based price 
indexes, and as shown by Ghironi and Melitz (2005) , its behavior differs from the real exchange rate 
defined in terms of price indexes representing average prices of varieties. 
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Proposition 2. Given a symmetric initial steady state, a small increase in *L causes an 
increase in w  , a decrease in */w w , and an ambiguous effect on q . 
The proof of Propositions 2 is provided in Appendix A. Figure 1 can also be used to 
understand the results in this proposition. A larger foreign labor force would shift FE 
curve rightwards and PT curve leftwards (shifts associated with Proposition 2 are not 
shown to keep the figure simple). Thus */w w  would decrease, but the effect on  q  is 
uncertain. The effect on w  is not clear in the figure as U  curve would also shifts towards 
the left.  However, the result in Appendix A that w  increases unambiguously suggests 
that the new U  curve lies below (above) the new equilibrium point if the U curve slopes 
downwards (upwards). Welfare implications of a larger foreign size are thus similar to 
those of foreign technological advance. 
4. Numerical Analysis 
 To complement our analytical results, this section undertakes numerical analysis 
to examine welfare effects for a real economy. The model is calibrated to US economy, 
which is treated as home economy. Foreign economy is defined as trade-weighted 
aggregate of major US trading partners. Derivation of analytical results was simplified by 
the assumption that home and foreign economies are symmetric initially. However, as the 
US economy differs significantly from its trading partners, the numerical analysis allows 
us to explore whether Propositions 1 and 2 hold in the presence of initial international 
differences. These differences could also introduce asymmetries in the welfare effects of 
home and foreign technological improvements and we also explore such asymmetries. 
Finally, the numerical analysis also enables us to examine the effect of large 
technological changes in each economy. 
21 
 
4.1 Calibration 
 Quantitative welfare analysis in our model is based on the system of three 
nonlinear equations (25)-(27), modified to allow the share of traded goods in 
consumption,  , to differ from its foreign counterpart, * . We develop a procedure 
(explained in Appendix B) that calibrates all parameters needed to solve the system. This 
procedure requires estimates of foreign relative labor supply ( * /L L ), initial steady-state 
values of the relative foreign real wage *( / )w q w , the share of imports in consumption 
( / )FE FEp Z C , and a subset of parameter,
* *[ , , , , , ]S k k    .  
 To determine initial steady state values, we use long-period averages of data for 
the US and its trading partners (Appendix B provides further details). Letting a bar over a 
variable denote the initial steady-state value, we normalize 1q w L   . Given this 
normalization, data on income per capita (in constant US dollars) and the population of 
US trading partners relative to US levels is used to estimate * *( / )w w q w and 
* *( / )L L L . The import share estimate utilizes US data on the share of trade flows 
(average of imports and exports) in GDP. 
Parameters in the subset S  have received considerable attention and we choose 
their values based on the estimates suggested in the literature. Variable trade costs consist 
of transportations costs, tariffs and nontariff barriers and have been measured directly as 
well as indirectly. Direct estimates of different components of variable trade costs 
suggest that a conservative estimate of the variable cost parameter,  , equals 1.2 (i.e., 
proportional trade costs are 20%).
19
 Indirect measures indicate that   is not much higher 
                                                 
19
 Anderson and Wincoop (2004) survey the measurement of trade costs. Their representative estimate of 
policy barriers (tariffs and nontariff barriers) is 8% for industrialized countries. The estimate of directly 
22 
 
than this value.
20
 We let   equal 1.2 in the baseline model, and explore higher values in 
the sensitivity analysis. 
Traditional classification identifies traded goods with non-service industries 
representing largely the products of Agriculture, Mining and Manufacturing sectors. It is 
generally recognized, however, that significant international trade also occurs in certain 
service industries (especially, industries producing financial, business and 
communication services). Data limitation, however, make it difficult to obtain good 
estimates of the share of service industries open to international trade. Reasonable 
assumptions about the shares of traded service industries for US and its trading partners 
suggest that   is between 0.38 and 0.42 while *  is between 0.46 and 0.49 (see 
Appendix B). 
To estimate the Pareto shape parameter, it is useful to express it as a sum of two 
components: ( 1)k     . Under the assumption of Pareto distribution,   would equal 
the inverse of the standard deviation of the log of firm sales. Helpman, Melitz and 
Yeaple’s (2004) estimates of the mean value of this standard deviation based on plant 
data for the US and firm data for Europe suggest a range of from 0.6 to 0.8 for  . We use 
a value of 0.7 for   to determine k  conditional on the value of  . US trading partners 
are likely to have, on average, lower productivity dispersion ( *k k ) and thus we assume 
a large value of 1.1 for * *( 1)k    . 
                                                                                                                                                 
measured freight costs (based on US data) is 12%. Transportation costs would be higher if the cost of the 
time value of goods in transit is added. They also find that additional border costs are substantial (some of 
these costs may be included in fixed export costs in our model). 
20
 For example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) suggest a value of 1.3 for this parameter to explain certain 
empirical puzzles in open economy macroeconomics. 
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 Estimates of the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods vary 
over a wide range depending upon the estimating procedure and the type of data used.
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A number of calibrated models (e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2007) assume a value for 
equal to 2 or 3. However, the assumed sorting pattern that exporters are more productive 
than local producers in each country significantly constraints the feasible range of values 
for   for our calibrated economy. These constraints are explained in Appendix B. In our 
asymmetric case (with much lower foreign real wage), one important restriction is that 
there is an upper bound on  , which is a function of *,  and    . Assuming that 1.2  , 
the upper limit is just below 2.05 for the low values of the shares of traded goods 
*( 0.38, 0.46)    and slightly below 2.30 for the high values ( *0.42, 0.49   ). 
We assume a baseline value of 2.0 for  , which is below the upper bound implied by the 
sorting pattern.
22
  
4.2 Results 
 This section discusses the basic results of the numerical analysis on the welfare 
implications of changes, first in the foreign and then in the home economy.
23
 Recall that 
in our calibration exercise, the home economy is the US while the foreign economy is the 
                                                 
21
 Estimates of the average value of the substitution elasticity estimated from disaggregated trade data tend 
to be large even if sectoral elasticities are assumed to be homogeneous (see Imbs and Mejean, 2011). These 
estimates are based on the preference structure typically assumed in trade models, in which the elasticity of 
substitution between a pair of varieties is the same regardless of where they are produced. Note, however, 
that the estimates of the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign bundles are generally much 
lower in an alternative specification where this elasticity is assumed to differ from the elasticity of 
substitution between varieties in each bundle (see Feenstra et al., 2012), 
 
22
 It is also above the critical value, 
1 , and thus rules out the reversal of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. 
Note that 
1 , is less than 1/ (1 )  for the case 
*  . In our numerical analysis, we allow for *  . 
Our baseline value of   exceeds both 1/ (1 )  and  *1/ (1 )  for the entire range of values of   and 
*  . 
23
 The basic results are based on the baseline values of  ,  ,   and the two sets of values for  and * . 
We also did sensitivity analysis to variations in   (in the 2.0-2.5 range),  (within a range of 0.6-0.8) and 
 (within a range consistent with the sorting pattern), and found that the results did not change much.  
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combined economy of its trading partners. Table 1 shows the effects of changes in 
foreign technology and size on absolute and relative home welfare as well as the real 
exchange rate. We consider three sources of an improvement in foreign technology (an 
increase in * , an increase in *b or a decrease in *k ) and one source of larger foreign size 
(an increase in *L ). To facilitate comparisons between different types of foreign changes, 
we assume the magnitude of the change in each case to be such that it leads to a 10 % 
increase in foreign welfare ( *w ). Under this assumption, a change in *  or *b  has the 
same effect. The effect of a change in *k , however, differs from that of *  or *b . 
Determination of the effect of a decrease in *k , moreover, requires estimates of 
additional parameters. As explained in Appendix B, we obtain these estimates by using 
suitable normalizations and assuming a reasonable value for the survivor probability for a 
firm ( F ). 
 The results in the table show that Propositions 1 and 2 hold even for big changes 
(large enough to cause a 10 % increase in foreign welfare). The numerical analysis also 
provides results on the magnitude of the effects on home welfare in response to foreign 
changes. Foreign technological improvements lead to a very small increase in absolute 
home welfare, and thus cause a large decline in relative home welfare. For example, 
assuming high values for the home and foreign shares of traded goods, the increase in *  
or *b  improves home welfare only by 0.16% and relative home welfare deteriorates by 
9.84%. The most favorable case for home welfare is represented by the decrease in *k  
(under high traded goods shares), but even in this case, home welfare increases by mere 
0.43 % (relative welfare decreases by 9.57 %). 
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 Larger foreign size causes more substantial improvements in home welfare. The 
foreign increase in *L  brings about a 1.9 % increase home welfare in the case of high 
traded goods shares, and an increase of 2.12 %  in the case of low shares. The sign of the 
effect of larger foreign size on real exchange rate could not be determined in the 
theoretical analysis (see Proposition 2). The numerical analysis, however, indicates that 
the increase in *L  significantly lowers the real exchange rate (by about 4 %). 
Table 2 examines the effects of technological and size changes in the home 
economy on foreign welfare. The table shows the effects of an increase in   or b , a 
decrease in k , and an increase in L . Again, to facilitate comparison between different 
changes, the magnitude of each of these changes is assumed to be such that it leads to a 
10 % increase in home welfare ( w ). The signs of the welfare effects in Table 2 are the 
same as in Table 1, but there are important asymmetries in the magnitudes of these 
effects. The effects of home changes on foreign welfare turn out to be much stronger than 
the effects of foreign changes on home welfare. For example, an improvement in home 
labor efficiency that generates a 10 % increase in the home real wage  leads to 1.7 % 
increase in the foreign real wage (in the case of high traded goods shares) while an 
analogous foreign technological improvement causes a 0.16 % increase in the home real 
wage. Other home changes also produce a much larger effect on the foreign real wage 
than foreign changes on the home real wage. 
Asymmetries in the magnitudes of welfare effects can be attributed mostly to 
differences in the shares of traded goods and initial wages (income per capita) between 
the US and its trading partners. For example, if the US traded goods share is raised to the 
non-US level of 0.49 (in the high share case), the effect of the foreign improvement in 
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labor efficiency on home welfare would increase from 0.16 % to 0.44 % while the effect 
of home improvement on foreign welfare would decrease from 1.7 % to 0.86 %. The 
remaining difference between the effects on home and foreign welfare is accounted for 
largely by initial wage differences. These results suggest that a country with a higher 
share of traded goods and lower income per capita than its trading partner can expect a 
larger benefit from foreign technological advance. 
5. Conclusions 
 Recently, there has been much interest in international trade models based on 
Melitz (2003), which highlight trade in differentiated goods produced by hetereogeneous 
firms under monopolistic competition. In such models, one concern is that foreign 
technological progress harms a country as home firms are displaced by more productive 
foreign firms. A justification for this concern is provided by Demidova (2008) in a 
variant of the Melitz model that includes a competitive sector producing a costlessly 
traded homogeneous good. 
This paper argues that a country should not fear foreign technological progress 
but rather welcome it in the absence of a freely traded homogeneous good. In this case, 
the real exchange rate adjusts to maintain balanced trade in the differentiated good. The 
exchange rate adjustment in response to improved foreign productivity allows home 
firms to compete with more poductive foreign firms. We show that foreign technological 
improvements (in a variety of forms) always improve home welfare even if the Melitz 
model is genralized to include a nontraded good. 
The paper also examines the effect of foreign technological improvements on the 
real exchange rate. For an improvement in foreign labor productivity in the traded good, 
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we derive the condition under which the real value of foreign currency depreciates, 
contrary to the predictions of the Balassa-Samuelson model. Interestingly, the reversal of 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect always occurs in the model without the nontraded good. 
 A model with trade mainly in differentiated goods and a large nontraded goods 
sector seems relevant for many countries. We calibrate our model to data for the US and 
its trading partners. This case provides an interesting example of the welfare implications 
of technological change in trading countries that are significantly different. The 
numerical analysis reveals important asymmetries in the transmission of welfare effects: 
US gains much less from foreign technological improvements than its trading partners 
from US improvements. We attribute these asymmetries mainly to a smaller share of 
traded goods and a higher income per capita in the US than in its trading partners.   
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Appendix A 
Derivation of (23) 
Noting that [ ] /H HE HE w     , use (14) to express it as 
 
1 * 1 1 1( ) [1 ( / ) ( ) ( / )] ( / )[1 ( / )]H HE HE H HE EDw D D q
                       .(A1) 
Also, (10) and (11) imply that 1
/
( )
1
H
k
Dw
k
   

  
 
 while  (11) and (12) and their 
foreign counterparts imply that 
1 1 ( 1)( / ) ( / )kHE HE H H HE
           and 
1 1 ( 1)( / ) ( / )kFE FE F F FE
          . Use these expressions in (A1) and simplify the 
resulting equation to obtain (23) 
Derivation of (27) 
Use (7) and (11)-(13) and the corresponding foreign equations to obtain 
 
1 * ( 1)1
* * 1 **
1
1 *
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, (A2) 
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      
       
. (A3) 
Next, use (6), (11), (13), (16) and their foreign counterparts to express 
* 1 * ( 1) 1( ) ( / ) ( )kHE HE H H H HEp Z n q D w
              , and 
* * 1 * * * ( 1) * 1( ) ( / ) ( )kFE FE F F F FEp Z n D qw
              . Use these expressions in (18) to 
get 
 
1* * 1 ( 1)*
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F FEH H
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. (A4) 
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Divide (A2) by (A3), and in the resulting expression, use (A4) to substitute for 
* * 1
1
( )
( )
F F
H H
n
n


 



 and (10) and its foreign counterpart to substitute for H
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

 and 
*
*
F
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

 to derive 
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(A5) 
Finally, note that (4) and its foreign counterpart imply that 
1 (1 )(1 )/
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while (20) and its foreign counterpart imply that 
* * *1 ( 1)(1 )/
1 ( 1)(1 )/
D L w
D Lw
  
  
  
  
  . Making these 
substitutions in (A5) and simplifying this equation, we obtain (27). 
 
Proof of Result 1 
For 
1
,
1


 
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, 21
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1 0
1
c k

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1 1
0
1

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   
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. 
For 
1
1,
1


 
 
 
, 
21
1
limc

  , 
21
1/(1 )
lim 1c
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 , and 21 / 0c    , since 
1
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

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1/(1 )
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 

 
 , and / 0    . Thus there exists a value of   in this 
interval, 1 , for which 21 0c  , and 21c  is greater (less) than zero as  is  greater (less) 
than 1 . 
Proofs of Propositions 
Express the nonlinear relations (25), (26) and (27) as 
*
( , , )
w
w f q S
w
 , * *
*
( , , )
w
w f q S
w
  
and 
* *
( , , )
w w
g q S
w w
 , where S  is the set of model parameters. In the initial state, assume 
that the home and foreign countries are homogeneous (the home and foreign parameters 
are symmetric), and normalize 1L w    . To examine the effect of a change in 
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parameter ( )x S , take the log-linear approximation of the relations 
* *
(.)
(.)
w f
w f
  and 
*
(.)
w
g
w
  around a symmetric initial state to obtain the following two-equation system: 
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terms of initial values of parameters) as in (31) and (32); and 11 12 220, 0, 0c c c    while 
the sign of 21c  is given by Result 1 . The system can be solved for 
*ˆ ˆw w  and qˆ  as 
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 and 1  . 
Substitute these values in the log-linear approximation of the relation, (.)w f , and 
simplify to get  
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To prove Proposition 1, part (i), first let *x  . Note that (27) and (29) imply that
*
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 *
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. Thus, 
1 2,  and 0
1
d d
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
  

. Substituting these values in (A7) and (A8) and using Result 1, it 
can be shown that for *ˆ 0  , *ˆ ˆ ˆ0, 0w w w    and qˆ  is positive or negative as   is 
greater or less than 1  . Next, let 
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 *
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to (27) and (29), and use (28) to derive 
*
*
*
ln f
b
b


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
. Thus, 1 2,  and 0.d d   Again, 
substituting these values in (A7) and (A8) and using Result 1, we can derive the results 
for 
*ˆ 0b  . 
To prove Proposition 1, part (ii), let *x k . Use (28) to derive  
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have 1 0d   and 2 0d  . Given these signs, (A7) and (A8) imply that ˆ 0w   for 
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(higher dispersion), but the signs of *ˆ ˆw w  and qˆ  are indeterminate as 1 22d c  is positive 
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Appendix B 
 
Data-based parameters 
Steady-state values of the relative foreign real wage ( * /w w ) and relative foreign 
labor supply ( * /L L ) are measured, respectively, as weighted averages of GDP per capita 
(in US dollars, averaged over 2001-2010) and population (also averaged over 2001-2010) 
of major US trading partners relative to US levels. The trading partners group includes 15 
leading US trade partners accounting for 73.4 % of US imports and 71.5 % of US 
exports.
24
 The weights used to compute averages for this group are based on the share of 
trade (average of imports and exports) with each partner in the total trade with the group. 
The source of the data for GDP per capita and population is the World Development 
Indicators 2011 (from the World Bank) and for trade flows is the US Census Bureau.  
To measure home and foreign shares of traded goods ( *,  ), we need estimates 
of the shares of non-service industries and service industries with trade for both the US 
and its trading partners. For the share of non-service industries, we use Word Bank data, 
                                                 
24
 The countries included in the US trading partner group are: Canada, Mexico, China, 
Japan, Germany, U.K., South Korea, France, Taiwan, Brazil, Netherlands, Singapore, 
Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and India. 
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which are available for US as well as nearly all countries in the US trading partner group. 
Other sources of sectoral data (e.g. STAN data base) provide more disaggregated sector-
level data, but are not available for some important US trading partners. The share of 
non-service industries in GDP [defined as one minus the share of service industries (ISIC 
51-99), and averaged over 2001-2010] is 0.23 for the US and 0.37 for the trading partner 
group (based on trade-weighted averages).
25
 The share of service industries open to 
international trade is difficult to estimate as the data on trade in services by industry are 
not available in sufficient detail. We assume that the share of traded service industries in 
all service industries is between 0.20 and 0.25 for the US and between 0.15 and 0.20 for 
its trading partners.
26
 Calculating the share of traded services industries in GDP under 
this assumption and adding it to the share of non-service industries, we obtain a range of 
0.38-0.42 for   and 0.46-0.49 for  * . 
Calibration procedure 
To allow for *  , express the model consisting of (25)-(27) as 
   
/
/( 1) 1 * * /( 1) * /( 1)( / ) /
k
k
k k kw L L w w q

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  
, (B1) 
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*/ *
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* * * */( 1) * 1 * */( 1) * * /( 1)( / ) /
k
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k k kw L L w w q

           
  
, (B2) 
                                                 
25
 For this calculation, Taiwan is excluded because the share data for this country were not available from 
the World Bank source. 
26
 International trade in services is likely to occur largely in industries producing information, finance and 
insurance, and professional and business services. Based on the US (Bureau of Economic Analysis) data, 
the average share of these sectors (over 2001-2010) in all service sectors is 0.29. We assume that a major 
portion of these sectors represents traded service industries. Shares of these industries are not available for 
all US trading partners, but STAN data suggest that the share of similar industries tends to be smaller in 
non-US countries.  
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To calibrate * *, ,  and     , we derive an additional relation that determines the 
share of imports in consumption defined as FE FE
p Z
impsh
C
  as follows. First, use (3), (6) 
and (7) to write the import share as 
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foreign counterpart, (16) and (24) modified to let 
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. Also noting that 
*/ /HE FE FE HEp p Z Z  from (18), and using (6), (20) and their foreign counterparts 
modified to allow 
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the relation for the import share, we have 
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Given * *,L w , the values of parameters in the subset * *[ , , , , , ]S k k    ,  and our 
normalization  ( 1)q w L   ,  (B4) can be used to determine   as  
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Next given , *  can be determined from (B3) as 
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Finally, we can determine   and *  from (B1) and (B2) as follows 
 , 
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Constraints on parameters in S  
The sorting pattern for home and foreign exporters and local producers requires 
that 1 *
E D D q
      and  * 1 * *E D q D
     . Using (20) and its foreign counterpart, 
these constraints under our normalization can be expressed as 
 
*
* *1 ( 1)(1 *)/ *
1
1E L w   

 
  
  

 , (B9) 
 
*
* * 1 * * *1 ( 1)(1 *)/ *
1 1E
L w   
 
     
 . (B10) 
 
Note that  
1
( 1)kE k






     and  
1*
* * * * ( 1)
*
kE k






    . The values assumed for 
parameters in S  must satisfy (B9) and (B10) and are thus constrained. 
Changes in * * *,  and b k  
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The effect of a change in * * or b  operates via * . Noting that  
* */( 1)
* * * *( 1) / / ( )
k k
b

    

         and 
* *
*
* *
1
( 1)
k
k

 
 
   
  
, we have 
 
** * *1 */( 1) * /( 1) * * */( 1) * *
*
* *
[( 1) / ] ( / ) [ / ( ( 1))]k k k k kb k k         
 
     
  . (B11) 
*  increases in both * * and b , and its elasticity with respect to * * and b  is 
* / ( 1)k     and *k , respectively. The effect of changes in * * or b   in Table 1 is 
calculated by determining the change in *  that would cause a 10% increase in *w . 
A change in *k  would affect both  *  and * . As (B11) indicates, values of * * *, and b    
would be needed to determine the elasticity of *  with respect to *k . Our strategy is to 
normalize * *1,  1b    and make a reasonable assumption about F  to derive 
*  as 
follows. First, letting *k  denote the initial value of *k  and assuming that 0.5F  , we 
use the foreign counterpart of (21), with * 1  , to determine *  as 
 
*
* *
*
*1 *
F
k k
L w 



  . Next, with * 1b  , we determine *  as 
 
1
*/( 1) ** *
*
*
( 1) / /
k kk


   


     
 
 
 . Given *  and * 1  , *  is determined, which 
allows us to pin down 
* *
* *
*
 
 


 . These values are used to calculate how *  would 
change in response to a change in *k . Since  
1*
* * * * ( 1)
*
kE k

 


    , we can readily 
determine the effect of a change in *k on * . A similar approach is used to determine the 
effect of changes in  or b  and k in Table 2. 
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Figure 1. Diagrammatic Analysis of the Model 
 
Note: FE is the free entry relation (eq. 31); PT is the price trade balance relation (eq. 32); 
and U  is the relation for costant home welfare (eq. 33). FE’ represents a shift in FE line 
due to an increase in or b* or to a decrease in k* while PT’ represents a shift in PT line 
due to a decrease in k*. 
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Table 1. Effects of Changes in Foreign Technology and Size 
 
 
      Percentage Change in 
 
    Absolute  Relative  Real 
    Home Welfare  Home Welfare  Exchange 
    ( w )   ( */w w )  ( q ) 
 
Low Shares  
( *0.38, 0.46   )   
 
An increase in * * or b  0.10   -9.90   3.43 
 
A decrease in *k   0.21   -9.79   3.81 
 
An increase in *L   2.12   -7.88   -3.94 
 
High Shares  
( *0.42, 0.49   ) 
 
An increase in * * or b  0.16   -9.84   2.49 
 
A decrease in *k   0.43   -9.57   3.57 
 
An increase in *L   1.90   -8.10   -4.09 
Note: In each case, 1.2   and 2.0  . Magnitude of each change is chosen to ensure 
that *w  increases by 10 %. 
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Table 2. Effects of Changes in Home Technology and Size 
 
 
      Percentage Change in 
 
   Absolute  Relative   Real 
   Foreign Welfare Foreign Welfare  Exchange 
    (
*w )   ( * /w w )  ( q ) 
 
Low Shares  
( *0.38, 0.46   )   
 
An increase in  or b   2.08   -7.92   -5.32 
 
A decrease in *k   4.79   -5.21   -10.18 
 
An increase in L   5.83   -4.17   3.32 
 
High Shares  
( *0.42, 0.49   ) 
 
An increase in  or b   1.70   -8.31   -4.04 
 
A decrease in *k   4.11   -5.89   -8.67 
 
An increase in L   4.86   -5.14   3.32 
Note: In each case, 1.2   and 2.0  . Magnitude of each change is chosen to ensure 
that w  increases by 10 %. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
